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LAWSON'S AWESOME
(ALSO WRONG, SOME)
Michael Stokes Paulsen*
It is always fun, and a rare treat (for me, at least), to be attacked from the right. Professor Gary Lawson has me down as a
stark-raving moderate. According to Professor Lawson, my
proposition-that Congress may abrogate the judicial doctrine
of stare decisis in constitutional cases 1 - is, absolutely sound as a
matter of present doctrine(!) 2 but wrong as a matter of the original meaning of Article III and the Necessary and Proper Clause
(which Lawson calls the "Sweeping Clause," after founding-era
practice rather than current shorthand).
Professor Lawson's argument, in a nutshell, is as follows.
Major premise: The Sweeping Clause precludes enactment of
laws that are not "proper" for carrying into execution the powers
of another department, including (and this is the key) laws that
interfere with those departments' autonomous exercise of their
enumerated functions, unless the Constitution specifically permits it. 3 Minor premise: "The judicial Power" of Article III includes "the power to reason to the outcome of a case. " 4 Conclusion: "Even if the courts are applying a wrongheaded, or even
unconstitutionally wrongheaded, method of decision-making,
the Sweeping Clause does not empower Congress to prescribe a
different process. " 5

*

Briggs & Morgan Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. Copyright 2000.
I. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the Precedential Effect of Roc and Casey?, 109 Yale L.J. 1535 (2000).
2. Gary Lawson, Controlling Precedent: Congressional Regulation of Judicial Decision-Making, 18 Cons!. Comm. 191, 200 (2001). ("Professor Paulsen devotes much of
his analysis to a demonstration that his proposed precedent-restricting statute is consistent with long-established doctrinal understandings about congressional power to regulate the judicial process. He is entirely right about this.") (emphasis added, footnote omitted).
3. Id. at 199.
4. Id. at 210.
5. Id. at 211.
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Under Lawson's admirably relentless reasoning, Congress
cannot "properly" pass a statute forbidding courts to decide
cases on the basis of coin flips, or the color of litigants' skin, or
on the basis of vote-swapping or vote-selling. Congress simply
has no power to pass any laws that affect the process of judicial
case-deciding, other than to prescribe (some) rules of procedure.6 (This is an important concession, as we shall see.)
This does not mean that courts can do whatever they want.
It just means that the only constitutionally permitted remedies
for outrageous or even unconstitutional misuses of the judicial
power by the courts are, according to Lawson, (1) impeachment;
and (2) executive refusal to enforce such decisions (in some circumstances). These are big sticks, and, judging from his other
writings, Lawson apparently would wield them quite aggressively: He thinks that stare decisis is unconstitutional, 7 that the
impeachment power is quite broad, 8 and that the President rightfully may refuse to execute clearly unconstitutional decisions of
the judiciary. 9 Putting these views together, it would seem to follow that it is constitutionally "proper" (in Lawson's world) for
Congress to impeach a judge who regularly follows prior precedent rather than the original public meaning of the Constitution's text, where the conflict between precedent and original
meaning is clear. Put starkly, Congress may impeach judges for
following stare decisis to reach results that they otherwise would
be persuaded are wrong on originalist premises. In addition, the
executive legitimately may refuse to enforce wrong judicial decisions that rely, wrongly, on stare decisis. 10
6. Id. at 210, 224.
7. Id. at 228-29. For Professor Lawson's argument that the doctrine of stare decisis
is unconstitutional, sec Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 23 (1994). Cf. Paulsen, 109 Yale L.J. at 1548-49 n.38 (cited in
note 1) (distilling this argument and collecting authorities).
8. Gary Lawson and Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitu·
tiona/Interpretation, 81 Iowa L. Rev. 1267, 1309-13 (1996).
9. Id. at 1324-26.
10. I am not absolutely sure whether Lawson would find it legitimate to decline to
enforce judicial judgments that rest on stare decisis, because he docs not explicitly say so.
But this conclusion seems to follow from the clarity of the constitutional case against
precedent, as sketched by Lawson (and Lawson generally can be counted on to follow his
premises where they lead him): Professor Lawson's standard for "executive review" of
judicial judgments is whether the President has "a very high degree of confidence" that
they are unconstitutional. Lawson, 18 Canst. Comm. at 42 (cited in note 2). See also
Lawson and Moore, 81 Iowa L. Rev. at 1324-26 (cited in note 8). And Professor Lawson
has a very high degree of confidence that the doctrine of stare decisis is unconstitutional.
See Lawson, 17 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol. at 24 (cited in note 7). A fully informed Lawsonian President therefore would seem authorized (if not obliged) to nullify judicial deci·
sions that rely on stare decisis to reach results contrary to the original public meaning of
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But nonetheless-now, let me get this straight, GaryCongress and the President cannot enact a statute purporting to
oblige the judiciary to decide federal cases in conformity with
these principles, the violation of which properly could subject
the judges to impeachment and lead the executive to refuse to
enforce the judgments thus rendered?! It is an unconstitutional
intrusion on the province of the judiciary to pass a statute stating
correct principles of constitutional law, but constitutional to hang
the judges for departing from those principles?
Professor Lawson is also forced by his view of the Sweeping
Clause to conclude, quite cheerfully, that many congressional
regulations of judicial practice, including standard-of-review
provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the organic acts of many agencies, are
all probably unconstitutional, the product of twentieth-century
legislative adventurism.ll Also unconstitutional are Federalistera congressional usurpations like the Full Faith and Credit Act
(1790) and the Anti-Injunction Act (1793). Only the Rules of
Decision Act escapes the sweep of Lawson's sweepingly narrow
view of the Sweeping Clause, but only because Lawson thinks it
"an exhortation rather than a regulation," being merelf "declaratory" of what the Constitution requires in any event. 1 Thus
it is that I have betrayed true principles of originalist constitutional interpretation and fallen into the abyss of mere sound doctrinal exposition, by saying that Congress can abrogate stare decisis: "Professor Paulsen has history, practice, and doctrine on
his side. Indeed, he has everything except the Constitution. " 13
As usual, Professor Lawson's writing is brimming with brilliant insights. I suppose I should be satisfied with Lawson's conclusion that the legal world can reject my position that Congress
may abrogate stare decisis by statute only by repudiating so
much else it holds dear, and just leave it at that. With enemies
like Lawson, who needs friends?

the Constitution.
(I actually agree with Lawson on all of these points-except, of course, for his weakkneed limitation of executive review to cases of "clear" judicial error. See Michael
Stokes Paulsen, Nixon Now: The Courts and the Presidency After Twenty-Five Years, 83
Minn. L. Rev. 1337, 1357 n.67 (1999). My argument that Congress possesses power to
abrogate stare decisis by statute does not, however, depend on these premises. I am engaging Lawson here on his own premises.)
II. Lawson, 18 Const. Comm. at 223 (cited in note 2).
12. Id. at 217.
13. Id.at200.
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But I'm greedy. I want more: I want the originalist-purists,
too. And I think I should be able to get them, because this time
I've got Lawson dead to rights: His two key concessions-first,
the nuclear alternatives of impeachment and nonexecution as
constitutionally legitimate checks on the courts; and second, the
legitimacy (or at least harmlessness) of the Rules of Decision
Act as a statute declaratory of what should be understood as the
proper constitutional rule in any event-give away the whole
ballgame.
I. THE IMPEACHMENT AND NONEXECUTION

CONCESSIONS
I wish Lawson had said more about his wildly provocative,
but eminently defensible, twin points that Congress may impeach federal judges for disregarding the Constitution in favor of
erroneous judicial precedents, and that the President may disregard judicial decisions that reflect such disregard, at least in
fairly clear cases. But I will leave these points to the provocateur, for present purposes. 14
My point here is less sweeping (so to speak): Why could not
a statute directing federal judges to apply the Constitution, statutes, and treaties of the United States, rather than erroneous judicial interpretations of them, be thought "necessary and
proper" for carrying into execution the impeachment and nonexecution powers of Congress and the President, respectively, by
laying the groundwork, or predicate, for the exercise of these
more drastic checks on an errant judiciary? Isn't it "proper" to
fire a warning shot across the bow, before dropping The Big One
on the judiciary? Isn't the judgment of the necessity for doing so
pretty much committed to Congress, under the approach of
McCulloch v. Maryland? 15 Isn't the message implicitly conveyed
by a statute abrogating stare decisis that it is Congress's view that
such a statute, not the judicial doctrine of stare decisis, marks the
true path of judicial duty? Does such a message have to come
coupled with an overt threat of impeachment in order to fall
within Congress's constitutional power to legislate?
Since more than a few readers might not accept the idea
that stare decisis is actually unconstitutional, let me return to my

!4. His arguments are laid out fairly extensively in Lawson and Moore, 81 Iowa L.
Rev. at 1311, 1324-29 (cited in note 8). You can look it up.
15. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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more humble example: Congress passes a statute prohibiting
coin-flips as a way of deciding judicial cases. If one prefers,
make the hypothetical sharper by adding a provision declaring
that deciding a case in such a manner may well be regarded by
Congress as an impeachable offense. (Congress probably can't
bind in advance, by statute, the separate judgments of the
House, to impeach, and the Senate, to convict, for such an offense, but just play along with the hypothetical for a moment.)
Does the no-coin-flips statute exceed Congress's power under
the Sweeping Clause? If not, what distinguishes a statute abrogating stare decisis? 16
I can't think of a way for Lawson to wriggle out of this trap,
but he's a clever guy, and I'd like to see him try. The short point
is this: Once one concedes that some modes of judicial decisionmaking are so out-of-bounds as to be grounds for executive nonenforcement and even impeachment, then a law regulating or
prohibiting such modes of judicial decisionmaking can readily be
conceived as falling within the Sweeping Clause, as necessary
and proper for carrying into execution these other powers for
checking judicial violations of the Constitution. And if stare decisis is thought to be one of those unconstitutional modes (as
Lawson argues), then a law prohibiting it is likewise necessary
and proper for carrying into execution these other powers.
Thus, under my premise that stare decisis is not constitutionally
required, Congress may abrogate the mere judicial policy of stare
decisis. And under Lawson's premise that stare decisis is affirmatively unconstitutional, it is surely "proper" for Congress to
enact a statute barring its use by the judiciary.
II. THE RULES OF DECISION ACT CONCESSION
Just about every congressional statute ever passed that
regulates how cases are decided by courts is unconstitutional,

16. Just as Congress could pass a statute barring coin flips, on the ground that it
would regard such a process of judicial decision-making as quite possibly presenting an
occasion for exercise of the impeachment power (notwithstanding that the process of deciding cases is an exclusively judicial power), so too it could pass a statute banning the
president from exercising one of his plenary powers in what Congress regards as an arbitrary or corrupt manner (such as, the granting of presidential pardons in return for campaign contributions or silence in a criminal investigation of the president, to conjure examples of equally unimaginable misuse of constitutional prerogative). In either case, the
act of Congress wouldn't preclude defiance by the other branches, but would fall within
the scope of the Sweeping Clause power of Congress to enact laws "necessary and
proper" for carrying into execution its impeachment power.
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Lawson argues. 17 The Rules of Decision Aces survives, however, because it is "an exhortation rather than a regulation, along
the lines of 'decide cases correctly' or 'observe National Vinegar
Month."' 19 Such a declaration "does not change the legal landscape" and thus "does not implicate the principle of decisional
independence." 20 It is therefore not unconstitutional for Congress to have passed such a purely declaratory law.
I am far less convinced than Lawson that the Rules of Decision Act is merely declaratory. But I will again accept his premise for the sake of argument, in order to see where the argument
leads. I think it leads to this principle: If instructions to courts as
to how to go about deciding a class of cases are merely declaratory of correct constitutional principles that should apply in any
event, it is not "improper" for Congress to embody such instructions in a declaratory statute. I take this to be what Lawson is
saying in his no-harm-no-foul treatment of the Rules of Decision
Act. If that is right, and if (as Lawson believes) stare decisis is
unconstitutional, why is it beyond Congress's power to direct
courts to apply the Constitution, rather than judicial interpretations thereof, in the event of a conflict between the two? Isn't
such a statute a "choice of law" provision almost precisely
analoRous to the Rules of Decision Act? Isn't it purely declaratory?
This brings me back to Lawson's interpretation of the
Sweeping Clause. Can a law be "necessary and proper for carrying into execution" the judicial Power if it directs the courts to
do what the Constitution (rightly construed) directs the courts to
do in any event? Yes-certainly yes, if a declaratory Rules of
Decision Act is constitutional (and Lawson thinks it is). 22 Such a

17. Lawson, 18 Const. Comm. at 211 (cited in note 2).
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 ("The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution
or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be
regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases
where they apply.")
19. Lawson, 18 Const. Comm. at 223 (cited in note 2).
20. !d. at 217.
21. A different type of objection might be that a statute abrogating stare decisis
would either be redundant (if Lawson's views on stare decisis are correct) or an unconstitutional infringement on judicial autonomy (in any other case of a statute regulating the
processes of judicial decisionmaking). But Lawson appears to have no problem with redundancy. Declaratory statutes are just fine. !d. at 217 and n.94 (citing Agency Hol~ing
Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 162 (1987) (Scaha, J., concurnng)
(collecting early cases taking the view that the Rules of Decision Act is declaratory of
what would be the proper rule in any event).
22. !d. at 217.
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statute is "proper" unless it interferes with decisional independence, and it does not interfere with decisional independence if it
does not alter judicial obligation rightly construed. Whether it is
"necessary" is a different question. But necessity is largely a
matter of congressional judgment. 23
Surely Congress may judge declaratory statutes to be reasonably calculated to assure the legitimate end of courts properly performing their constitutional tasks Sometimes courts
need reminders of what should be obvious. Sometimes a point
might not be so obvious after all. Sometimes it is good to clarify
a point of possible misunderstanding, out of an abundance of
caution. 24
In any event, Congress may deem it "proper" to express its
view through enactment of a statute embodying that view.
(Once again, doing so could be a first step appropriate to the exercise of more drastic powers, like impeachment.) If the view
embodied in Congress's statute is wrong as a matter of the constitutional question at hand, the courts of course are free (indeed, obligated) to disregard it. That, of course, is the holding of
Marbury v. Madison. 25 In such a case, the statute is unconstitutional not because any and all statutes declaring judicial obligation exceed Congress's power under the Sweeping Clause, but
because this one is substantively unconstitutional. And conversely, if the view embodied in Congress's statute is not wrong,
it does not violate the Constitution for Congress to enact it in the
form of a declaratory statute, if Congress thinks it useful to promoting a constitutionally legitimate end to do so.
So, with all due respect to Professor Lawson (and much respect is due), I must quibble with his conclusion that, since

23. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 413-14. Actually, Professor Lawson might
dispute this, too. Lawson, 18 Const. Comm. at 199 n.37 ("All of the relevant inquiries
under the sweeping clause are objective; the Constitution does not commit interpretation
of the sweeping clause exclusively to Congress."). I am not prepared to dispute his disputation here, and perhaps we do not disagree at all, if I cast the point in more precisely
Lawsonian lingo: The Constitution does not supply a rule of law that would justify judicial invalidation of Congress's judgment, within broad bounds, of the necessity of a particular measure for carrying into execution a power of Congress or another Department.
24. Thus the Latin legal maxim, ex abundanti cautela. See Fort Stewart Schools v.
Federal Labor Relations Auth., 495 U.S. 641,646 (1990).
25. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803). Not that anybody (except Gary Lawson!)
thinks it necessary, but I have defended the correctness of Marbury's reasoning, as an
original matter, in other writings. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch:
Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 Georgetown L.J. 217, 228-62 (1994). See
Lawson, 17 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol. at 26, n.12 (cited in note 7) (emphasizing that his citing
of Marbury is for its persuasive value only).
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" [t ]his declaratory role was understood in the founding era ...
the Rules of Decision Act therefore does not reflect any
underlying theory of the sweeping clause." 26 Huh? Sure it does:
The fact that such a declaratory statute would have been widely
understood as not improper means that congressional statutes
declaratory of constitutionally proper rules of judicial decisionmaking are within the power of Congress to enact. The Rules of
Decision Act demonstrates that the Sweeping Clause permits
Congress to enact statutes that declare and enforce correct constitutional rules, including rules that touch on the exercise of the
judicial office. And if that principle is correct, Lawson should
have no problem with a statute declaring that judges should not
apply what Lawson believes is the unconstitutional doctrine of
stare decisis.
My original argument was a bit narrower: that, whether or
not the doctrine of stare decisis is unconstitutional, it is at least
not constitutionally required, and is thus a matter of mere judicial
policy that Congress has authority to alter by statute.Z 7 But if
Lawson is right in saying that the practice of stare decisis is not
only constitutionally unnecessary, but constitutionally improper,
then the case for the validity of a statute abrogating stare decisis
is all the stronger. And if he is right in saying that the Constitution permits impeachment and nonenforcement as remedies for
clearly wrong judicial decisions, then the case for the validity of a
mere statute seems all the stronger yet. In short, Lawson's
premises, if accepted, only strengthen my argument, at every
point (in addition to making it seem "moderate" by comparison).
III. WHY, GARY, WHY?
Why does Awesome Lawson, whose infidelity to conventional constitutional wisdom is otherwise so impressive, worship
at the idol of judicial autonomy to employ even "unconstitutionally wrong" 28 methods of constitutional decision-making, at least
as far as Congress's power to do anything about it through legislation passed pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause is
concerned? Why does Lawson, whose formalism is otherwise so
relentless, become the most fuzzy-wuzzy of functionalistpragmatist-balancers (if I may be so insulting) when he says that
26.
27.
28.

Lawson, 18 Const. Cornrn. at 217, n.94 (cited in note 2).
Paulsen, 109 Yale L.J. at 1543 (cited in note 1).
Lawson, 18 Const. Cornrn. at 194-95 (cited in note 2) (emphasis deleted).
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"circularity is common, and unavoidable, in many separation-ofpowers contexts"? 29 I barely recognize the Pharaoh of Formalism when he concedes, in a string of situations, that "one cannot
30
avoid the exercise of judgment based on shades and degrees. "
Shades and degrees?! Under Lawson's fuzzy Constitution,
the "nondelegation doctrine" forbids the delegation by Congress
of policy decisions that are important enough that Congress
should make them. 31 An "officer" or "principal officer" under
Article II is someone whose responsibilities are important
enough to deserve such a label. 32 Whether procedural rules "slip
into substantive regulations of judicial decision-making ... must
be assessed on a case-by-case basis to determine whether they
unduly regulate the decision-making process." 33 Whether a statute interferes with executive power depends on whether it "unduly interfere[s]" with executive power. And adjudication of
substantive due process claims calls on courts "to exercise that
same capacity which by tradition courts always have exercised:
reasoned judgment."
Okay, Lawson did not actually say these last two. I made
them up, just to be mean. Only the Supreme Court possibly
could say such things and really mean them. 34 But the logic of
Lawson's "proper" -means-in-accord-with-background-understandings-of-separation-of-powers-and-federalism-and-individual-rights
reading of the Sweeping Clause does-as he comes dangerously
close to conceding-tend to create a free-float of "constitutional
values" for deciding cases. 35 It is hard to distinguish such a
"springboard" methodology from that which liberal-activist
judges have used with the Due Process Clause. Say it ain't so,
Gary!
I submit that the "proper" approach to separation-ofpowers questions is to ascertain whether the text of the Constitution supplies a rule, either through a specific provision or as a
necessary deduction from its structural arrangements, that invalidates a particular political choice or that commits that choice
29. Lawson, 18 Const. Comm. at 225 (cited in note 2).
30. Id.
31. ld.
32. ld.
33. Id. (emphasis added).
34. Compare Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654,693-696 (1988); Planned Parenthood
v. Casey, 505 U.S. at 849.
35. Lawson, 18 Const. Comm. at 199 (cited in note 2). For a more detailed criticism
of this methodology, as applied to separation-of-powers questions, sec Paulsen, 109 Yale
L.J. at 1580-82 & n.121 (cited in note 1).
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to a different decisionmaker, and then to apply the logic of such
rule rigorously and relentlessly. This is what I would have
thought my sometime hero, Gary Lawson, would do. A true
Lawsonian formalist would find an independent counsel statute
(or independent agencies) unconstitutional, not because they interfere "too much" with executive power, but because the power
violates the clear constitutional text that the executive power is
to be vested solely in "a President" and because law-execution is
almost incontestably an executive power. 36 A true Lawsonian
formalist would find that there isn't any "nondelegation doctrine" in the Constitution because the document contains no rule
that states how specific Congress's policy determinations need
be and how much may be left to execution by the Article II
branch. 37 A true Lawsonian formalist would conclude that the
Constitution fails to state a rule concerning what is required for
"officer" or "principal officer" status, leaving Congress lots of
room to decide these things as it thinks best. And a true Lawsonian formalist would conclude that there is no line distinguishing Congress's power to regulate matters of judicial "procedure"
from power concerning "decision-making methodology," but
only a sweeping power of Congress to enact laws for carrying
into execution the judicial power.
The answers to separation-of-powers questions do not call
for "the exercise of judgment based on shades and degrees."
They call for the principled derivation of sound categories and
for categorical, deductive reasoning.
This is exactly what Professor Lawson used to say. Consider this passage from a 1990 article in part about good formalist methodology:
Formalism, at least in my hands, is an application of originalist textualism to questions of constitutional structure. Defined more precisely, formalism consists of a substantive principle of interpretation ('Resolve separation of powers
questions using only the text, structure, and background of
36. Steven G. Calabresi and Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 Yale L.J. 541 (1994). It is a significant concession on Lawson's part to
say that there is no comparable clear rule as to the meaning of "the judicial Power."
Lawson, 18 Canst. Comm. at 202-03 (cited in note 2). If it cannot be said that the Article
III judicial power entails an autonomous power to prescribe a doctrine of stare decisis, or
itself provides a rule of stare decisis, a congressional statute abrogating the doctrine is
simply not analogous to an (unconstitutional) act vesting unreviewable executive power
in someone other than the President of the United States.
37. Such a delegation must be to the Article III branch, however. Mistretta v.
United States, 488 U.S. 361,416-17 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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the Constitution, applying late eighteenth-century America as
the locus of meaning for those interpretative variables') and a
primary inference ('The vesting clauses divide otherwise unallocated federal governmental authority into three kinds of
functions and fully distribute it among three distinct sets of in.
.
') 38
stitutrons
.

Lawson then proceeded to contrast formalism with functionalism, where "the question of blending is treated as one of degree
rather than, as with formalism, one of kind." 39 How far CroMagnon, Formalist Lawson has "evolved" in just a decade to
Balancer Lawson! Apparently, constant bathing in the pool of
legal academia has resulted in a certain degree of softening of
the skin.
Truth be told, I do not really fear that Lawson has grown
squishy in his principles. I say these things only to needle and
provoke my friend, and to make a closing point: True formalist
principles lead to my conclusion, not Lawson's. The Constitution simply does not create an autonomous power of judicial policy-making that authorizes courts to place matters of judicial policy and administration ahead of decision in accordance with the
law. And if the Constitution doesn't confer such a power on the
courts, then it is both proper and necessary for Congress to pass
a statute telling the courts that they can't just go off and make up
such a power on their own.

38. Gary Lawson, Territorial Governments and the Limits of Formalism, 78 Cal. L.
Rev. 853, 859-60 (1990).
39. Id. at 860.

